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Abstract
This paper considers family formation and reciprocity-based
cooperation in the form of sharing of earnings-risk. While risk
sharing is one benefit to marriage it is also limited by divorce risk.
With search in the marriage market there may be multiple
equilibria diering not only in divorce rates but also in the role of
marriage in providing informal insurance. Publicly provided
insurance, despite potential equilibrium multiplicity, is shown to
aect family formation and financial cooperation monotonically.
Some aspects of the model are then tested using international
survey data and a bivariate probit model with sample selection.
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Marriage as an institution has changed dramatically in the post-war era. The patterns are
the same in many countries: age at ﬁrst marriage has increased, cohabitation as a format for
partnership has become more popular; but perhaps more pronounced than any other indicator
is the rapid increase in the number of divorces. These trends continue to be controversial. In
particular, the issue of increasing divorce rates is sensitive for very good reasons: most notably,
the concern is for the children who are likely to become the victims of divorce.
Paralleling the rapid growth of divorce rates has been the expansion of welfare state arrange-
ments in most developed countries. By providing a wide range of support such as e.g. unem-
ployment insurance, beneﬁts to lone parents etc. welfare state arrangements make it easier for
individuals to cope on their own, and can therefore be expected to aﬀect family structure.
Taking a negative view it is conceivable that a main eﬀect of public beneﬁts and transfers
is to crowd out private informal transfers and to make couples less willing to “stick it out”.
Then if there are negative externalities associated with divorces — most notably on the children
— there is a case for adopting a sceptical view. However, welfare state arrangements may also
allow individuals to gain ﬁnancial independence from their partners. In such an environment
partnerships would be presumably be formed and maintained, not for ﬁnancial security, but for
“love”. Thus, social policies may enable individuals to spend more time in healthy relationships.
Indeed, a number of recent contributions have started to consider the eﬀects of welfare
policy on family structure (see below). Many of these studies have used simulation models
calibrated to US data; however, a casual look at the data reveals that the US is, in international
comparison, exceptional by having a relatively low level of social expenditures compared to e.g.
most European countries while still having the highest aggregate divorce rate. Figure 1 which
plots social expenditures as percent of GDP against aggregate divorce rates for a number of
OECD countries reveals at best a positive association.1
The purpose of this paper is to suggest a simple framework for analyzing some of the issues
involved. The model incorporates marriage and divorce, and cooperation between partners in
the form of voluntary sharing of earnings-risk. A main starting point for the model presented
is that ﬁnancial cooperation between partners is generally not legally enforced.
1Social expenditures include old-age cash transfers, disability cash beneﬁts, occupational injury and disease,
sickness beneﬁts, family cash beneﬁts, unemployment compensation, early retirement beneﬁt s ,a sw e l la se x p e n -
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Figure 1: Social expenditures (% of GDP) and aggregate divorce rates for a number of OECD
countries. Year: 1995. Source: OECD Social Expenditure Database 1980-1997 and Euromoni-
tor.
The ﬁrst part of the paper sets up a model with a couple who can cooperate by sharing
earnings-risk but also have the option of divorcing. Match-quality varies over time and divorce
occurs when the net beneﬁt of remaining married (which includes the beneﬁts from risk-sharing)
becomes negative. The earnings of each partner ﬂuctuates and a couple thus have the option
of smoothing their individual consumption paths through voluntary transfers. However, absent
legal enforcement risk-sharing is sustained by expected reciprocity, which in turn is limited by
the presence of a divorce risk.
The model is closed by the introduction of a marriage market with search. Given “agglom-
eration” in search, multiple equilibria may occur; these will then exhibit qualitative diﬀerences:
whereas one equilibrium may exhibit a low “turnover” in the marriage market and a high
degree of ﬁnancial cooperation, another equilibrium will exhibit the converse pattern of high
2“turnover” and less risk-sharing by partners. Equilibrium multiplicity thus oﬀers a potential
explanation for cross-country heterogeneity in divorce rates and attitudes towards the economic
role of marriage.
The model is then used to consider the eﬀects of policy. It is shown that, despite po-
tential equilibrium multiplicity, publicly provided earnings insurance aﬀects family formation
monotonically, increasing turnover in the marriage market and reducing the role of the family in
providing risk-sharing. Given that there are potentially multiple equilibria, a natural question
is which is better: a high- or a low-turnover equilibrium? This answer to this question is argued
to be ambiguous when cooperation is supported by reciprocity.
Finally I present an empirical analysis using international survey data. I estimate a bivariate
probit model with sample selection, where in the ﬁrst stage the dependent variable is whether
or not the respondent is married (or has a steady life-partner) and in the second, for those
individuals that do have partners, the dependent variable is whether they are pooling incomes
with their partners.
The current paper draws on number of diﬀerent strands of literature. The literature on
marriage and divorce was pioneered in the seminal papers by Becker (1973) and Becker, Landes
and Michael (1977) and is surveyed in Weiss (1997). Recently Drewianka (2000) has used
am o d e ls o m e w h a ts i m i l a rt oo u r s—a l b e i tw i t haf o c u so nr e l a t i o n - s p e c i ﬁci n v e s t m e n t s—t o
consider a number of proposals for reforms in the legislation surrounding marriage. Hess (2001)
uses micro-level data to try to infer the importance of risk-sharing and love by considering how
diﬀerent properties of the individuals’ income streams aﬀect the probability of divorce.
There is a growing literature on marriage markets with search. An early contribution is
Mortensen (1988). More recently search models of the marriage markets have been used to con-
sider social phenomena; e.g. Burdett and Coles (1997) consider the possibility of endogenous
assortative mating. Burdett et al. (1999) have considered the eﬀect of continued search for bet-
ter partners while matched and show that this option can create multiple equilibria. Chiappori
and Weiss (2000) note that, if ﬁnding a new partner is uncertain, then divorcing individuals
will ﬁnd it privately optimal to enter insurance arrangements involving post-divorce transfers
conditional on the event or “non-event” of remarriage.
A growing literature considers the eﬀect of welfare policies on family structure and welfare.
Aiyagari et al. (2000) use a model with marriage market search to consider intergenerational
income mobility. The impact of social policies on income distribution, transmitted through a
3marriage market with search and through endogenous fertility, is also considered in Greenwood
et al. (2000a). Neal (2000) looks at the interplay of marriage market conditions and government
policy in determining the attractiveness of out-of-wedlock childbearing (See also Greenwood et
al. (2000b)).
The current analysis also draws on the growing literature on voluntary risk-sharing. This
literature originated with the contributions by Kimball (1988) and Coate and Ravallion (1993).
Kocherlakota (1996) and Ligon et al. (1997) noted that optimal risk-sharing arrangements are
generally not stationary (even when the underlying income-generating process is). Ligon et
al. (1998) introduce savings and Foster and Rosenzweig (2000) introduce altruism between
the agents sharing risk. The current paper contributes to this literature by allowing for en-
dogenous breakups by partners sharing risk; on the other hand only “stationary” risk-sharing
arrangements are considered — conditioning of current transfers on past transfers is not allowed.
The paper is organized as follows. Section II sets up the basic risk-sharing model. Section III
studies the risk-sharing and divorce behavior of a given married couple. Section IV considers the
eﬀect of marginally extending formal insurance on risk-sharing and divorce while still ignoring
family formation decisions (marriage and remarriage). Section V introduces the marriage market
and Section VI considers the features of the steady state equilibria. Section VII discusses a
number of extensions while Section VIII presents the empirical analysis. Finally Section IX
concludes.
II The Risk-Sharing Model
In this section the basic risk-sharing model is set up. The model is highly stylized and abstracts
from a number of issues that can be expected to be important. E.g. I abstract from children
and other relations-speciﬁc investments, as well and diﬀerences in earnings-expectations across
individuals. The reason for doing so is to focus more clearly on the risk-sharing aspects of
marriage, while keeping the model tractable. All of the above mentioned omission are, however,
discussed in Section VII.
In this section, as well as the following two, the focus will be on a given married couple.
The state of the marriage is described by a match-quality variable. This variable is intended to
capture two aspects of the relationship. First, it is intended to capture feelings of love. Second,
it is also intended to capture all economic gains from the marriage except risk-sharing; this can
include e.g. beneﬁts from specialization and the consumption of public goods. To capture the
4notion that “love comes and goes” the match-quality evolves stochastically as a simple Markov
chain. The couple can then be expected to divorce when the match-quality falls suﬃciently
low.2
In each period, each partner also receives a random income; for simplicity incomes are
assumed to be uncorrelated across time and individuals. The partners can smooth their con-
sumption by engaging in risk-sharing through voluntary transfers. However, given that transfers
between the partners are not legally enforced they must be based on expected reciprocity. As
such the sustainability of voluntary risk-sharing will be limited by the divorce risk; however,
since risk-sharing is one beneﬁt from marriage it also inﬂuences the divorce decision. Each
partner always has the option of walking away from the marriage (“no-fault divorce”).
Match Quality
Let θ ∈ R denote match-quality. For simplicity — and to focus on transfers between partners
as a risk-sharing device — partners are assumed always to agree on the match-quality. There
is a ﬁnite set of match qualities, Θ =
©
θ0,...,θNª
which is ordered increasingly: j>iimplies
θj > θi.L e tπij denote the probability that the match-quality will be θj next period given that
it is θi in the current period.
Assumption 1. The Markov transition matrix Π = {πij}
N
i,j=0 is regular and satisﬁes the fol-
lowing stochastic dominance condition:
Pj
k=0 πik is weakly decreasing in i for every j.
The stochastic dominance property ensures that a good match-quality tomorrow is more
likely the better is the match-quality today; it thus ensures a degree of “persistence”.
Incomes and Consumption
Utility of consumption, u(·), is increasing, concave and bounded. In each period each partner
earns an income y ∈
©
y1,...,yMª
. The probability that an individual earns yi in any given
period is denoted gi. There are no savings.
2T h el i t e r a t u r eh a sp u tf o r w a r dt h ei d e at h a td i v o r c e sa r ee ﬃcient in the sense that they occur when the
utility from continued marriage falls short of the sum of the husband’s and wife’s outside opportunities. This
eﬃciency result requires transferable utility and symmetric information (see Becker (1991) and Peters (1986)).
In the current model outside opportunities are symmetric and common knowledge.
5Risk Sharing
Three assumptions about the risk-sharing will be made, all of which require some comments.
First, risk-sharing is assumed to occur only between individuals who are currently married —
all other relationships are assumed to be either too unstable or not to lend themselves easily
to risk-sharing. Second, recent work on risk-sharing (in environments without breakups) has
shown that it may be optimal to condition current transfers on past transfers. However, since
the current analysis extends previous work by introducing endogenous breakups, it is natural to
simplify the problem in another dimension; thus transfers are assumed to be conditioned only
on current income and match-quality. Third, love does not come in the form of “altruism”,
only in the form of enjoyment of being together. Allowing the individuals sharing risk to
care about each others consumption (or utility) is known to aﬀect self-enforceable risk-sharing
arrangements in two ways (see e.g. Foster and Rosenzweig, 2000). First it makes an individual
more willing to make transfers to his/her partner, simply out of concern for the other person.
This relaxes the incentive constraints (see below) and enables more transfers. However, there
is also a second eﬀect, viz. an altruistic individual will voluntarily make transfers even when
there is no implicit cooperation; this limits the threat of non-cooperation, which in turn tightens
the incentive constraints. Hence, the reason for not incorporating altruism is more conceptual
then practical: while in the current formulation, an individual who decides to leave his or her
partner simply gives up the enjoyment (positive or negative) of being with that other person;
in contrast, if match-quality came in the form of altruism, then one would need to take a stance
on the question whether an individual can consciously change his or her preferences by deciding
to depart.
Given the current match-quality θ and consumption c, the period utility obtained by an
individual is u(c)+θ. An individual’s consumption c may deviate from his/her current income
y due to transfers to/from the partner. Each partner maximizes the own expected discounted
stream of utility.
The partners agree on risk-sharing on a period-by-period basis — no long-term commitment
is possible. This takes the following form: if one partner receives an income ym and the other
an income yk, where yk <y m, the former should transfer a non-negative fraction, αmk,o ft h e
diﬀerence
¯ ¯ym − yk¯ ¯ to the latter. Transfers are assumed to be symmetric between the partners
(i.e. the agreed on transfer does not depend on who receives ym and who receives yk). A
risk-sharing agreement is thus an agreement, for one period, on how much to transfer, for each
6pair of income realizations ym,yk where ym >y k, from the partner with the higher income to
the partner with the lower income. It is therefore fully described by a vector α,
α ≡ (αmk)m>k =( α21,α31,α32,...,αm1,...,αmm−1,...,αMM−1).
If half the earnings-diﬀerence is transferred, αmk = 1/2, the partners enjoy the same con-
sumption; larger transfers than that will never be relevant. α can therefore be restricted to be
in the set A ≡ [0,1/2]
M(1−M)/2.
The agreement α determines each partner’s (ex ante) expected utility from consumption in



























Note that υ(α) is maximized when αmk = 1/2 for all m>kreﬂecting the fact that the optimal
private arrangement would be to share risk completely in each period. This may however not
be incentive compatible.
III The Decision Problem Facing a Married Couple
For now the utility of singlehood will treated as exogenous (and the same for both partners).
Thus let V (s) denote the discounted expected utility from starting a period as single; later on
V (s) will be endogenized by the introduction of a marriage market. The focus will be on steady
states; hence time will not be included as argument in the Bellman equations.
Incentive Compatible Plans
The timing within each period is as follows: ﬁrst the couple learns the current match-quality
θ. Based on that observation they decide whether to stay together or to divorce. If they
stay together they also decide on a risk-sharing agreement α for that period; ﬁnally earnings
are realized. In the beginning of each period the partners are identical and are assumed to
choose among plans so as to maximize their common discounted stream of future expected
utilities. However, some risk-sharing agreements may not be incentive compatible. It is therefore
7necessary to consider the consequences of a partner failing to make an expected transfer. A
f a i l u r et om a k ea ne x p e c t e dt r a n s f e ri sa s s u m e dt ol e a dt oa ni m m e d i a t ed i v o r c e . 3
Ap a r t n e rw h oi sc a l l e du p o nt om a k eat r a n s f e rm u s tt h e r e f o r eb eb e t t e ro ﬀ making the
expected transfer — given that this leads to continued marriage — than unilaterally triggering
divorce; noting that these incentive constraints are all forward-looking and seeing as the transi-
tions between match-qualities follow a Markov chain, the decision problem facing the couple is
identical at the beginning of any two periods where the match-quality is the same. A straight-
forward dynamic programming approach can therefore be adopted to characterize the couple’s
optimal decision. For each θ ∈ Θ,d e ﬁne V (θ) as the maximal (common) discounted stream of
future expected utility given the current match-quality θ and let δ ∈ (0,1) denote the discount
factor.
Since the couple can either divorce — which would give the value V (s) — or stay together,
V (·) must satisfy the following optimality equation: for all i,














The second term in the large brackets represents the value of staying together; associated
with this option is a choice of risk-sharing agreement α (prior to the resolution of earnings-
uncertainty). If the couple decides to stay together α must also be such that no one will be better
oﬀ, at any income realization, by unilaterally causing divorce through failing to make the agreed
on transfer. The set of incentive compatible (or “self-enforceable”) risk-sharing agreements, Ai
(a subset of A) generally depends on the current match-quality θi —i np a r t i c u l a rAi can be
expected to be smaller the worse is the current match-quality, a conjecture that will be veriﬁed
below.
The self-enforceability constraints are thus forward-looking and can be formulated as follows:







+ θi + δ
N X
j=0
πijV (θj) ≥ u(ym)+δV (s). (3)
3The literature on risk-sharing usually assumes that there is a reversion to the static no-transfer equilibrium.
This captures the idea of broken trust. Note, however, that generally we would expect there to be a severe
renegotiation problem. The same renegotiation problem occurs in the current model; if the couple knows that
they are well-matched they would be better oﬀ forgetting the deviation.
4It is implicitly assumed that the deviating spouse loses the match-quality in the deviating period; this
assumption is not crucial.
8The left hand side is the utility associated with making the prescribed transfer while the right
hand side is the utility of deviating. Since the set of sustainable risk-sharing agreements Ai
depends on the current match-quality θi, so will in general the chosen α; hence the notation
α(θ) can be used to denote the risk-sharing agreement adopted when the match-quality is θ.
Equation (2) together with (3) deﬁnes V (·) as the solution to a functional equation. Next it is
demonstrated that, under a suﬃcient condition, the functional equation has a unique solution
and that V (·) has some expected properties.
Risk-Sharing and Divorce
Since match-quality has a consumption value it is a natural conjecture that the couple is better
oﬀ the higher is the current match-quality. A low enough match-quality can also be expected
to trigger divorce. However, if low match-quality triggers divorce — and a high current match-
quality has a degree of persistence (Assumption 1) — then a high current match-quality is also
associated with a low future divorce risk. This in turn facilitates more risk-sharing since risk-
sharing is based on expected reciprocity. Thus it seems natural to conjecture that a high current
match-quality is associated with a high current level of risk-sharing. This should then further
contribute to making the couple better oﬀ when the current match-quality is high.
Note however that since the scope for risk-sharing increases when the divorce risk decreases,
staying together almost becomes self-motivating. To ensure uniqueness a condition is imposed.
It should be stressed that the condition, which imposes an upper bound on the value of risk-
sharing, is only suﬃcient and, in most cases, probably far from necessary.5 Thus assume:
















C o n s i d e re . g . t h ec a s ew h e r et h e r ea r eo n l yt w oi n c o m el e v e l s ,y1,y2. The left hand side
increases in the income diﬀerence
¯ ¯y2 − y1¯ ¯ and in risk-aversion; moreover g1g2 is maximized
when the income variance is maximized. The inequality then places an upper bound on the




and g1 = g2 = 1/2;t h e
condition then requires that δ < 0.8 while for other g1 and g2 the critical δ is closer to unity.
5Indeed, it is a suﬃcient condition for (2) to identify a mapping which satisﬁes Blackwell’s suﬃcient condition
for a contraction mapping, which in turn is suﬃcient the functional equation to have a unique solution (see the
Appendix for details.)
9The ﬁrst conjecture can now be veriﬁed: the higher is the current match-quality, the better
oﬀ is the couple.
Claim 1. The value function V (·) is unique and weakly increasing in θ.
Proof. See the Appendix.
Knowing that V (·) is increasing is suﬃcient to establish a cut-oﬀ rule for the divorce
decision. Suppose that the variability in θ is large enough that there will be some match-
qualities where the couple stays together and some where they break up; then by deﬁning
b θ ≡ max{θ ∈ Θ|V (θ)=V (s)} it follows that the couple stays together only as long as θ > b θ.
Combining the observation that divorce occurs at low match-qualities with the monotonicity of
V (·), and invoking the assumption that a high current match-quality is associated with high
future match-qualities (Assumption 1) it can also be veriﬁed that risk-sharing is an increasing
function of the current match-quality.
Claim 2. Given that the couple have not separated at time t, the level of risk-sharing in that




Proof. See the Appendix.
Indeed, what drives this result is that the set of self-enforceable risk-sharing agreements,
Ai, is smaller the worse is the current match-quality θi. The main results from this section is
thus that the match-quality drives both the divorce decision and the risk-sharing decision. The
better is the current match-quality, the more risk will be shared by the partners, and, due to
t h ep e r s i s t e n c eo ft h em a t c h - q u a l i t yt h el o w e ri st h er i s ko ff u t u r ed i v o r c e . G e n e r a l l ym a t c h -
quality will unobserved, but suppose we had access to panel data on risk-sharing and divorce
behavior; then the model makes the very natural prediction that more current cooperation is
negatively associated with future divorce risk. A similar phenomenon was reported by Johnson
and Skinner (1986) who found that women tend to increase their labour supply a couple of
years prior to divorce.
IV A Partial Equilibrium Eﬀect of Formal Insurance
This section provides, by ignoring the possibility of re-marriage, a partial equilibrium analysis
of the impact of public insurance on divorce behavior and risk-sharing. Publicly provided
6α(θ
0) ≥ α(θ) if every element in α(θ
0) is at least as large as the corresponding element in α(θ).
10insurance is shown to make the couple more prone to divorce in the sense that it expands the
set of match-qualities where they divorce.
Two forces are at work: ﬁrst — since formal insurance is more valuable to an individual
who has no other insurance available — there is direct positive eﬀect of formal insurance on
the probability of divorce: intuitively formal insurance implies that an individual can aﬀord to
leave a relationship that has gone sour even if that means forgoing future access to informal
risk-sharing. However, by making divorce more attractive the direct eﬀect then also reduces
cooperation in the states where the couple actually stays together which further increases the
relative attractiveness of divorce and so on.
To demonstrate these eﬀects formally it is convenient to focus on the case where there
are only two possible income levels y1 and y2;t h i ss i m p l i ﬁes the analysis and avoids making
assumptions about the form of the publicly provided insurance: as long as formal insurance
based only on current individual income it reduces to a net transfer from individuals with high
income, y2, to individuals with low income, y1.T h u sl e tτ denote the tax imposed on individuals
with a current high income. By budget balance, the transfer to low-income individuals must
equal (g2/g1)τ. Hence, given τ, the net incomes are




Consider then a marginal expansion of formal insurance from a situation with less than full
insurance (i.e. initially e y2 > e y1). Note that, with formal insurance included, and using M =2 ,
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The subscript on α is dropped since with just two income levels α reduces to a scalar.
To emphasize the impact of τ,w r i t eb θ(τ) for the critical match-quality. The main result is
that b θ(τ) is monotonic in τ:
Claim 3.S u p p o s et h a tM =2and that no remarriage is possible. Then b θ(τ) is non-decreasing
in τ.
Proof. See the Appendix.
Publicly provided insurance is often suspected of crowding out private insurance coverage.
But formal insurance can also crowd out less formal forms of insurance that occur within
11families. This was noted e.g. by Berry-Cullen and Gruber (2000) who argue that a reason why
t h el i t e r a t u r eo nt h es o - c a l l e da d d e d - w o r k e re ﬀect typically ﬁnds relatively small eﬀe c t si st h e
existence of unemployment insurance. The current model focuses on direct transfers between
partners as opposed to compensating income streams; yet the analysis suggests that crowding
out can be pervasive. No formal analysis will be provided here, but the main arguments are
straightforward: consider a marginal expansion of formal insurance, and suppose that private
transfers were reduced on a one-for-one basis. This would increase the relative attractiveness
of divorce since the expansion of formal insurance would make singlehood more attractive.
This would make the couple more prone to divorce, which in turn would further reduce the
sustainable levels of voluntary risk-sharing; thus, in the end, crowding out may be more than
one-for-one.7
V Family Formation
The analysis in the previous section was only of a partial equilibrium nature in that family
formation was ignored. To get a more complete picture a marriage market is now introduced.
The Marriage Market
Assume that the economy consists of a continuum of unit measure of inﬁnitely lived individuals.
Each individual is either married or single; let S ∈ [0,1] denote the number of single individuals.
Single persons search for new partners. Let φ(S) denote the probability of ﬁn d i n gap o t e n t i a l
partner during a period of search (for simplicity I assume that a searching individual meets
at most one potential partner during a period of search). The probability of ﬁnding a partner
depends non-negatively on the number of searching individuals: φ(0) = 0 and φ0 (·) ≥ 0 (“ag-
glomeration”). Search has no cost but a searching individual does not have anyone to share
income with; hence the expected utility during a period of search is υ(0).
Potential partners meet at the end of a period of search; at the beginning of the next period
they learn their initial match-quality. Based on the initial match-quality two newly matched
7To formalize the above arguments one would need to assume that the partners’ incomes are, somehow, per-
fectly negatively correlated; without this assumption formal insurance and informal risk-sharing would not be
directly comparable. Di Tella and MacCullogh (1999) and Attanasio and Rios-Rull (2000) have recently consid-
ered the crowding out eﬀect of formal insurance on voluntary risk-sharing and the above argument essentially
follows Di Tella and MacCullogh (1999) with the addition of a breakup risk (see their Proposition 3).
12individuals decide whether to form the partnership or to continue to search. Since the Markov
process for the match-qualities is regular it has a limiting distribution F deﬁned on Θ.T h e







f (θi)=1.( 6 )
The distribution F is a natural candidate for the distribution of initial match-qualities. Since
I assume that there are no speciﬁc marriage- or divorce costs, two newly matched individuals
are in exactly the same position as a couple that have been married for any arbitrary number
of periods with the same match-quality and will hence adopt the same cut-oﬀ rule.
The Choice of Critical Match-Quality
When remarriage is possible, the value of starting a period as single, V (s), is endogenous.
Formally, there is, in addition to (2) and (3) which characterize V (θ), an equation for V (s).
This equation has the following form:












where υ(0) is the within-period expected utility and the bracketed term is the value of the
continuation; φf (θ) is the probability that the individual will ﬁnd a new partner with initial
match-quality θ and with probability 1 − φ no new potential partner is located during the
period. The matching probability φ is taken as given by a searching individual even though it
is determined by the aggregate behavior of the individuals in the economy.
Since V (s) is now endogenous, the cut-oﬀ rule can now best be viewed as a function of
the matching probability φ. Thus introduce the notation b θ(φ) t oh i g h l i g h tt h a tt h ec u t - o ﬀ
rule adopted by the individuals depends on the matching-probability φ. Clearly, the larger is
φ the easier it is to ﬁnd new potential partners. This implies that singlehood becomes more
attractive: why stay with a partner when the relationship has turned sour if it is easy to ﬁnd
a new partner? Equally, it makes sense to be “picky” when meeting a new potential partner.
Thus, as φ increases, b θ(φ), should, if anything, increase. Indeed, the next claim veriﬁes that
this so. But a higher cut-oﬀ level also must be associated with reduced cooperation since it
increases the divorce risk; thus α depends negatively on φ:
Claim 4. The critical match-quality b θ(φ) increases in φ and, moreover, risk-sharing α(θ)
decreases in φ for all θ > b θ.
13Proof. See the Appendix.
Since φ increases in S Claim 4 indicates the strategic complementarity of joining the pool
of singletons: the more people join the pool, the more attractive it is for each individual to do
the same.
Flow Equilibrium
The steady state pool of singletons, S, is characterized by equal in- and outﬂows. Moreover,




> 0 denote the expected duration of
a new marriage with initial quality θ given the cut-oﬀ quality b θ. The expected time that
a single individual is away from the pool of singletons upon meeting a potential partner is
then
P




which naturally decreases in b θ, both since fewer meetings will result
m a r r i a g e s ,a n ds i n c et h ee x p e c t e dd u r a t i o no fe v e r yn e wm a r r i a g ew i l lb es h o r t e r( µ decreases in
b θ for every θ). An equation relating S to b θ c a nb eo b t a i n e db yn o t i n gt h a tS has the alternative
interpretation as the fraction of total time that an individual spends as single if the process is









where I used that 1/φ is the expected time until a potential partner is located. Equation (8)





Lemma 5. The steady state fraction of single individuals in the economy, S,i si n c r e a s i n gi n
the critical match-quality, b θ.
Steady States











. An equilibrium in thus a ﬁxed-




which maps the unit interval into itself. Noting
that S (·) increases in b θ (Lemma 5), b θ(·) increases in φ (Claim 4), and ﬁnally that φ0 (·) ≥ 0,i t
follows that the composite mapping is non-decreasing. Then, by Tarski’s ﬁxed-point theorem,
an equilibrium exists.
Furthermore, any equilibrium will under the natural assumption that there is suﬃcient
spread in θ be “interior”. To see this note that if consumption value of the best match-quality
14is positive, i.e. θN > 0, such matches will rationally never be rejected, ruling out a steady state
equilibrium with S = 1. On the other hand if the lowest match-quality, θ0, is so abysmal that
an individual will opt for divorce even if that means that he/she will never have the opportunity
to marry again there cannot be an equilibrium with S =0either.
VI Equilibrium Features
This section ﬁrst looks at how the provision of formal insurance aﬀects family-formation and
cooperation in the general equilibrium setting. After that qualitative diﬀerences of multiple
equilibria are investigated. Finally, the welfare properties of decentralized steady state equilibria
are considered.
General Equilibrium Eﬀects of Formal Insurance
The possibility of multiple equilibria oﬀers a potential explanation for why countries with similar
levels of social expenditures have quite diﬀerent divorce rates; moreover it allows this observa-
tion to be consistent with the claim that publicly provided insurance aﬀects family formation
decisions as well as the role of the family in providing ﬁnancial security in a monotonic fashion.
To demonstrate this, publicly provided insurance is now introduced into the general equi-
librium model. Consider again the case with only two income levels, y1 and y2 where y2 >y 1;
net incomes given by (4) and τ represents the generosity of public insurance. As usual with
multiple equilibria, it is of interest to look at the “extremal equilibria”. Thus let SL and SH
denote the lowest- and the highest steady state fraction of single individuals; to emphasize the
impact of formal insurance let τ be an argument for the bounds, i.e. Si (τ), i = L,H.
In Section IV is was noted that b θ was increasing in τ when no remarriage was possible;
the reason was that formal insurance is more valuable to single individuals, and that formal
insurance tends to crowd out private risk-sharing. The same eﬀects are at work in the general
equilibrium context implying that b θ still tends to be increasing in τ; although a general proof
is not available, simple suﬃcient conditions can be obtained. Consider e.g. the following





. Given any current θ the probability that a shock occurs which changes next period’s
match-quality is λ ∈ (0,1) (conversely, with probability 1 − λ the match-quality remains θ). If
a shock occurs the new match-quality is drawn from some distribution F, the density of which
is strictly positive on Θ.S i n c eF is also the long-run distribution associated with the stochastic
15process all initial match-qualities are assumed to be drawn from F. For this process, which will
be used more extensively below, it can be shown that a suﬃcient, but not necessary, condition
for b θ to be increasing in τ is that λ ≥ φ.8
Returning to the main model, suppose then that b θ increases in τ, i.e. that the direct eﬀect
is to make singlehood more attractive. Due to the strategic complementarity in joining the
pool of singletons, the direct eﬀect carries over to the general equilibrium setting. The set of
equilibria thus moves monotonically “upwards”. Stated in precise terms:
Claim 6.S u p p o s et h a tM =2and that b θ increases in τ;t h e nSL (τ) and SH (τ) both increase
in τ.
Proof. See the Appendix.
The model thus predicts that there is an underlying monotonic impact of an expansion of
formal insurance of family formation and breakup behavior in the sense that the set of equilibria
moves towards people spending more time as single.







using ζ to denote the average rate at which married individuals divorce, ﬂow equilibrium implies
S = ζ/(σ + ζ). Hence an expansion of formal insurance will increase the relative divorce rate
ζ/σ in both the lowest- and the highest equilibrium. Since risk-sharing in steady state is
monotonically related to S (through φ — see Claim 4) the model also predicts that an expansion
of formal insurance will lead to a reduction in cooperation between partners in the sense of
decreasing α(θ) — i.e. the model exhibits crowding out also in the general equilibrium setting.
More can be said about the absolute d i v o r c er a t ei fm o r es p e c i ﬁc stochastic processes are
assumed. Consider e.g. the “memoryless” stochastic process introduced above. For this process










absolute average divorce rate ζ increases with τ as long as b θ does so (e.g. as long as λ ≥ φ).
8For this speciﬁc process, ∆(θ) ≡ V (θ) − V (s) satisﬁes
∆(θ)=m a x
(







dF + δ (1 − λ)∆(θ)
)
.
Using this a proof can be constructed along the lines of that of Claim 3.
16Qualitative Diﬀerences of Multiple Equilibria
The logic of the comparative static exercise carries over to a comparison of multiple equilibria.
Thus consider an economy with at least two steady state equilibria; to avoid new notation
consider the extremal equilibria, L and H, where SL <S H.S i n c e Si = ζi/(ζi + σi) in each
equilibrium it follows that the relative aggregate divorce rate is higher in equilibrium H than
in equilibrium L, i.e. ζH/σH > ζL/σL. Moreover, for the “memoryless” stochastic process the
absolute divorce rate is higher in equilibrium H than in equilibrium L. This follows since S





SL <S H implies ζL < ζH.
Since, people spend more time looking for a partner (and generally marriages have shorter
expected duration and divorce rates are higher) in equilibrium H than in equilibrium L it is
natural to think of the former as a “high turnover” equilibrium and the latter as “low turnover”
equilibrium; from Claim 4, using that SL <S H and that φ(·) is increasing, it then also follows
that there is less risk-sharing in the high-turnover equilibrium than in the low-turnover equilib-
rium: for any given match-quality a married couple will share less risk in equilibrium H than
in equilibrium L, αL (θ) ≥ αH (θ) for all θ.
The model thus captures the idea that two fundamentally identical economies can sustain
diﬀerent equilibria where the people in one economy appear to be more “committed” to mar-
riages and enjoy more risk-sharing than the people in the other economy. More generally, the
attitudes towards marriage and ﬁnancial cooperation may diﬀer systematically. In other words,
the role of social norms may be to act as a coordination device under multiple equilibria.
Welfare Aspects
A matched couple views their match as having an option value; this value determines the
breakup rule adopted in a decentralized steady state equilibrium. A decentralized equilibrium
will, however, generally fail to be eﬃcient, and moreover, the direction of the distortion is
ambiguous. The ambiguity arises since there are two conﬂicting forces. First, there is a standard
“agglomeration” externality that arises when φ0 > 0 (see e.g. Diamond, 1982). If cooperation
had been contractible, the trivial conclusion would have been that any steady state equilibrium
would have (locally) too few single individuals. However, the eﬀect of an additional individual
joining the pool of singletons is also to make the threat of divorce more credible for those who
remain married, which, when cooperation is sustained by reciprocity, reduces risk-sharing.
17To see how the individuals look at the option value of a match, consider the memoryless
stochastic process outlined above; for this process, the value of beginning a period with a partner
in state θ ≥ b θ,i s
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#
.
The value of starting a period as single is,
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for every m>kand αmk (θ) satisﬁes the constraint with strict equality whenever the mk’th
constraint is binding.
Each individual treats φ as parametrically given. A couple then stays together as long as the





V (s).L e tr =( 1 − δ)/δ be the implicit “interest rate” that corresponds to the discount rate




= V (s) gives the following characterization of b θ
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The option value arises since, even if the current match-quality is less than perfect, it may
improve. However, a better match-quality can also be obtained by joining the marriage market.
Suppose e.g. that φ > λ; then a couple would only accept a current utility within marriage that
is strictly larger than the current utility of singlehood — i.e. the left-hand side of (10) is positive
— since singlehood is a “faster” way to obtaining a new match-quality than being married.
If risk-sharing had been contractible, each married couple would have agreed on complete
risk-sharing in each period of marriage, αmk (θ) ≡ 1/2 at all θ ≥ b θ. In that case the charac-
terization of the socially eﬃcient cut-oﬀ quality would be identical to Equation (10), except
18with
¡
φ + Sφ0 − λ
¢
replacing (φ − λ), implying a higher cut-oﬀ match-quality b θ; the extra term
indicates the beneﬁt to the searching individuals of expanding the pool of singletons.9
However, when risk-sharing is not contractible, the eﬀect of an additional individual joining
the pool of singletons would be to directly reduce the utility of those who remain married by
reducing the scope for cooperation.10 Hence a decentralized steady state equilibrium may have
locally too few married individuals. Equally, if there are multiple equilibria these cannot be
unambiguously welfare-ranked: whether a “high turnover” equilibrium (with a high average
match-quality among married individuals and low levels of risk-sharing) or a “low turnover”
equilibrium (with a lower average match-quality but higher levels of risk-sharing) is better
cannot be determined on an a priori basis.
A second welfare implication of reciprocity-based cooperation concerns the variability of
match-quality. A high match-quality not only has a consumption value, it also enables more
risk-sharing. However, the second marginal beneﬁt eventually decreases due to diminishing
marginal utility of consumption and, since at high-enough match-qualities, full risk-sharing is
sustainable. As a consequence, with reciprocity-based cooperation, the value function V (θ)
generally possesses an inﬂection point where it switches from being convex to being concave if
there is suﬃcient spread in θ. The initial convexity arises since an individual has the option of
leaving a low-quality partnership. Indeed, if full risk-sharing were contractible V (θ) would be
globally convex. E.g. for the memoryless stochastic process, if αmk (θ)=1/2 for all θ ≥ b θ,t h e n
V (θ) increases linearly in θ at all θ ≥ b θ;s i n c eV (θ)=V (s) for θ < b θ, V (θ) is then globally
convex. An increase in the variability of θ (in the sense of a mean-preserving spread of F)w o u l d
then positively aﬀect welfare. In contrast, if risk-sharing is reciprocity-based, it may be better
that people are more “homogenous” since this promotes valuable risk-sharing.
9The characterization can be obtained along the lines of Pissarides’ (2000) analysis of eﬃciency of decentralized
endogenous job-creation and destruction.
10Note that even in the case where risk-sharing is contractible, a married couple would become more prone to
divorce when an additional individual joins the pool of singletons: this is simply to the strategic complementarity
and would not constitute an externality. The diﬀerence here is that the utility of a married couple is negatively
aﬀected while remaining married.
19VII Extensions to the Theory
Relation-Speciﬁc Investments The most important omission from the model is all forms
of relation-speciﬁc investments. Empirical evidence suggests that children and joint property
stabilize marriages, causing the individual divorce hazard to drop over time (see Weiss and
Willis, 1997). The reason for omitting relation-speciﬁc investments from the current model
is two-fold. First investments by partners have recently been treated by other authors; most
notable is Drewianka (2000). Second, although including relation-speciﬁci n v e s t m e n t sw o u l db e
an interesting extension, the current model may not be ideal for the purpose. Suppose e.g. that
a married couple can make some investment that will increase the divorce costs (e.g. having
a child, jointly buying a house, building a network of joint friends etc.) It is then conceivable
that a couple would be willing to make investments in order to facilitate future cooperation.
However, one must then consider the degree of irreversibility of such investments: in the current
model where match-qualities follow a Markov process a couple is well-aware of the fact that love
does not last forever and that, consequently, they will eventually divorce. This is however an
artifact of the model which implies that it may not be suitable for studying partly irreversible
investments; indeed a model with “learning” may provide a more realistic setting.
Learning An alternative to assuming that match-quality evolves stochastically would be to
assume that the underlying match-quality is ﬁxed, but is only revealed over time (in the spirit of
Jovanovic (1979)). This formulation would more naturally lead to duration dependent divorce
hazards (as observed e.g. by Weiss and Willis (1997)). A couple that has been observed to stay
together for a long time has then presumably found out that their match-quality is very likely to
be high; their perceived divorce risk would then also be low, enabling substantial risk-sharing.
In such a generalization, current risk-sharing would be positively related to the couples current
b e l i e f st h a tt h em a t c hi sg o o d .
Persistent Income Shocks Allowing persistent income shocks could potentially lead to a
number of interesting new insights. When risk-sharing relies on expected reciprocity an in-
dividual’s willingness to make transfers to his/her partner hinges on him/her expecting the
favour to be reciprocated. However, if there is a high degree of income shock persistence, then
the time until the “tables are turned” will be longer which will reduce the scope for sustain-
ing voluntary risk-sharing. Persistency of income shocks would also introduce new elements in
20the marriage market analysis since each single individual would then be characterized by an
individual-speciﬁc expected stream of future incomes. Thus it would be necessary to consider
bargaining between newly matched individuals. Finally, allowing persistent income shocks could
potentially also shed light on the observed phenomenon that new information causing revised
expectations about future incomes can trigger divorces.
VIII An Empirical Investigation
The above theory accommodates the observation that there is no tight connection between
aggregate divorce rates and levels of social transfers in a cross-country comparison. However, it
also implies that both high levels of social expenditures and a high aggregate divorce rate should
negatively aﬀect the probability that any given individual has a partner as well as risk-sharing
by existing partners. In this section I present some evidence to support these predictions.
The current analysis is related to the growing empirical literature investigating the eﬀect
of welfare payments on marriage and divorce (see e.g. Moﬃtt, 1990). It is also related to the
literature on intra-household allocations (see Browning and Chiappori (1996) and the references
therein) where a common ﬁnding is that the “income pooling” hypothesis (i.e. that the source
of income does not matter for the allocation) is rejected. The current analysis however requires
international data which rules out using actual consumption data. Instead I use data from the
International Social Survey Programme (ISSP) 1994 survey on “Family and Changing Gender
Roles” which includes self-reported information on how couples organize their incomes.
I use two binary dependent variables: ﬁrst whether the respondent has a “partner”, and
second, if so, whether “incomes are pooled”. Both decisions depend on unobserved stochastic
factors, e.g. match-quality, which can be expected to be correlated. Hence I use a bivariate
probit model with sample selection: let z∗ = β0x+ε be a latent variable. The respondent “has
ap a r t n e r ”(z = 1) if z∗ > 0 and is “single” (z =0 )otherwise. For those individuals that have
partners, let q∗ = γ0w+η be a second latent variable such that income pooling with the partner
is “complete” (q = 1) if q∗ > 0 and otherwise is “incomplete” (q =0 )(see below). (ε,η) has a
bivariate normal distribution with zero means, unit variances and correlation ρ.T h et w os e t s
of regressors, x and w, may overlap but need not be identical.
21The Data
The ISSP 1994 survey was conducted in 22 countries. Some countries, however, had to be
eliminated due to data omissions.11 The sample was restricted to individuals aged 20-65 who
are either employed (full- or part-time) or unemployed, and who are either single or have partners
(who are employed or unemployed). The ﬁnal sample consists of 11 125 individuals from 16
current OECD countries: Australia, Austria, Canada, Czech Republic, Germany, Hungary,
Ireland, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Sweden, UK, and the US.
I include a number of country-level variables. To capture the eﬀect of welfare state arrange-
ments, I use social transfers as per cent of GDP.12 There are obvious pros and cons to using
such an aggregate measure, but the hope is that it will serve as an index for the extent to which
citizens are protected against earnings-losses. I also include each country’s aggregate divorce
rate (divorces per 1000 population). To capture “cultural eﬀects” a range of variables are used.
Since earnings-risk is related to the structure of the labour market I include (i) the female labour
force participation rate, and (ii) an employment protection legislation index which can range
(continuously) from 0 to 6 with higher values representing stricter regulation. Individual em-
ployment status is represented by dummies for “part-time employed” and “unemployed” (where
the eﬀects are allowed to diﬀer by gender). Dummies were included for “regular attendance to
religious services” and self-employment.
Age, age squared, gender (dummy for “male”) were included in both sets of regressors. For
education, categories were used; the base category is “primary education or less” and dummies
were included for “some secondary education” and “some university education”. In the income-
pooling equation I use information on household earnings (log of net annual earnings in 1994
US Dollars). To pick up the eﬀect of children I control, in the same equation, for household
11Israel, the Philippines, Russia, Bulgaria and Slovenia were eliminated due to lack of reliable income data.
Spain was eliminated because of a lack of information on education.
12The following sources were used in addition to the ISSP survey. Social transfers, which are taken to include
old-age cash transfers, disability cash beneﬁts, occupational injury and disease, sickness beneﬁts, family cash
beneﬁts, unemployment, compensation, early retirement, and housing-beneﬁts, were obtained from the OECD
Social Expenditure Database 1980-1997 (supplemented with information from the IMF Government Finance
Statistics Yearbooks). Female participation rates were obtained from ILO Yearbooks of Labour Statistics and
refers to females aged 15 and above. Divorce rates were obtained from the UN 1997 Demographics Yearbook.
The index of employment protection legislation is from OECD Employment Outlook June 1999 Table 2.5 (Overall
strictness, version 1).
22size: the base case is a two-person household; dummies were then included for households with
3-4 members and for households with 5 or more members. Finally I include dummies for prior
divorce by the respondent and the respondent’s current partner.
The ﬁrst dependent variable is a dummy which is unity if the respondent has a “partner”
(spouse or steady life-partner). For those individuals with partners there is a second dependent
variable constructed from the following question:
H o wd oy o ua n dy o u rs p o u s e / p a r t n e ro r g a n i z et h ei n c o m et h a to n eo rb o t ho fy o u
receive?
The available answers were (i) “I manage all the money and give my partner his/her share”,
(ii) “My partner manages all the money and gives me my share”, (iii) “We pool all the money
and each take what we need”, (iv) “We pool some of the money and keep the rest separate”, (v)
“We each keep our own money separate”. Less than 15 percent of the answers fell in category
(i) and (ii), and, moreover, men were somewhat more inclined than women to respond that
they give all the money to their partners. Since this suggested that (i) and (ii) does not signal
any strong “asymmetry” between partners I classify (i) through (iii) as “full income pooling”
(y = 1) whereas (iv) and (v) is interpreted as “incomplete income pooling” (y =0 ).
Results
As a preliminary step I estimated the model using only the explanatory variables measured
at the individual level and using country-dummies to pick up “cultural eﬀects”.13 Doing this
revealed that there are signiﬁcant country-speciﬁce ﬀects. Using the US as the reference country,
two patterns emerged: US citizens were considerably less likely to have partners then almost
everyone else (Ireland was an exception); moreover, people in e.g. the Nordic countries were
signiﬁcantly less likely to pool their incomes conditional on having a partner. Both these
results seem plausible given that the US has the highest aggregate divorce rate and the Nordic
countries have large welfare states. I then proceeded by replacing the country-dummies with
the aforementioned country-level variables. This allows me to check whether these variables
come out with the expected sign and if they can account for the cultural eﬀects. As shown
below, the variables came out with the expected sign and quite strongly. Moreover, there were
no qualitative eﬀects on the coeﬃcients for the individually measured variables.
13The results are available on request from the author.
23In interpreting the result one must however keep in mind the limitations; since the variables
are only measured at the country-level the “eﬀective number of observations” is obviously low.
Also, if the individuals in the same country are aﬀected by some common component not
accounted for their error terms will be correlated; the eﬀects of the country-level variables may
then be measured less precisely than their t-ratios suggest.
Column 2 of Table 1 shows the result for the “partner-equation”. The “marginal eﬀects” in
this case are calculated as traditional probit marginal eﬀects:







where φ(·) is the pdf for the standard univariate normal distribution.
The probablity of having a partner naturally increases with age. Education beyond sec-
ondary level has a negative eﬀect, particularly so for women; the results is consistent with two
ﬁndings in the literature: that divorce rates and education are negatively correlated (see e.g.
Becker et al. (1977)) and that highly educated individuals tend to marry late. That the eﬀects
of higher education diﬀer by gender is consistent with the “good catch” hypothesis for men and
the “self-reliance” hypothesis for women (Aassve et al, 2001). Part-time employment is posi-
tively associated with having a partner for women, consistent with specialization by married
couples, but negatively so for men. Unemployment has an unambiguously negative eﬀect. A
prior divorce naturally negatively aﬀects the probability of currently having a partner. Flexible
labour markets (low employment protection and a high female participation rate) negatively
eﬀects the probability of having a partner; ﬂexible markets may make it easier to manage after
a break-up and may also aﬀect the structure of the stochastic earnings so as to make it easier
for an individual to smooth consumption through individual savings.14
Turning to the main variables of interest both the aggregate divorce rate in the economy and
the level of social transfers aﬀect the probability of an individual having a partner negatively.
T h en e g a t i v ee ﬀect of social transfers thus conﬁrms the ﬁndings in the literature while the
negative of the aggregate divorce rate suggest the presence of a “social multiplier” (Becker and
Murphy, 2000) in the decision to enter and remain in partnerships.
Inspecting the predictions from the partnership-equation, there were no clearly discernible
geographical patterns of over- and under-predictions; the percent correctly predicted responses
14Blau, Kahn and Waldfogel (2000) found that favorable labor markets for women negatively aﬀected the
probability of marriage.
24Income Pooling Partner



























































Household Size 3-4 0.333
(0.049)
0.105 −−









































Uncensored obs: 7114 Log L = -9645.544
Table 1: Eﬀects on the probability of having a partner and the probability of pooling income
given a partner. Estimation by bivariate probit with sample selection. Robust standard error
in paranthesis.
25was somewhat lower in the US and the UK which is natural since these countries also had the
most even distributions of individuals with and without partners.15
Perhaps more interesting is the income-pooling equation, the results for which are presented
in column 1 of Table 1. The marginal eﬀects reported in this case is the direct eﬀect of the
regressors in w on the conditional probability of pooling income given marriage,











where Φ(·,·,·) and Φ(·) are the cdfs for the bivariate and univariate standard normal distribu-
tion, respectively.
Age appears to aﬀect the probability of income pooling positively; this is natural if there
is learning about an underlying match-quality since “age” presumably picks up the eﬀect of
duration. Education negatively aﬀects income-pooling. Education may act to stabilize the
income streams reducing the need for risk-sharing; it may also be due to the fact that highly
educated individuals tend to marry late, implying shorter duration. Income negatively aﬀects
income pooling.16 Part-time employment has a strong positive eﬀect on income sharing for
women, consistent with specialization with women working part-time in the household. The
eﬀects of unemployment are mixed; on the one hand it is positive for women which is consistent
with income-pooling arising in response to earnings-losses. On the other hand, for men the sign
is negative (but not signiﬁcant); this may, however, be partly due to an increased divorce risk
since a consistent ﬁnding in the literature is that unemployment increases the risk of divorce,
particularly for men.
The larger the number of people in the household the more likely is it that income is
pooled. This is consistent with the hypothesis that kids stabilize a relationship and/or appear
once the partners feel conﬁdent that their match-quality is good. Prior divorce, both for the
respondent as well as the respondent’s partners, strongly reduces the probability of income
pooling. Two explanations are conceivable. Controlling for age, a prior divorce may mean that
the current relationship is relatively “new”. Alternatively, prior divorce may act as a signal of
low commitment.
A high aggregate female participation rate negatively aﬀects income-sharing; this may be
due to specialization within the household being less the norm, and with that, that there is
15The countries that were diﬃcult to predict were the Czech Republic, Hungary and Japan.
16See Coate and Ravallion (1993) for comparative statics on reciprocity-based income-sharing.
26more a culture of ﬁnancial independence. On the other hand employment protection appears
to encourage risk-sharing. One possible explanation for this is that low employment protection
is associated with a high turnover rate in the labour market, which in turn makes it easier for
each partner to smooth his or her own consumption through savings.
Social transfers has, ceteris paribus, a negative eﬀect on income pooling suggesting that
public insurance indeed crowd out informal income-sharing. The aggregate divorce rate also
appears to have a negative eﬀect on income pooling (although the eﬀect is not statistically
signiﬁcant): a couple living in an economy where breakups are more frequent would thus appear
to be less likely to cooperate ﬁnancially than an otherwise identical couple. Finally the estimated
ρ has a positive sign which is consistent with the story where the partnership decision and the
income-sharing decision are driven in part by an underlying unobserved match-quality.
In conclusion the results seem consistent with the theory — social transfers as well as a high
aggregate divorce rate appears to aﬀect both the probability of marriage and the probability of
income sharing negatively. With respect to the impact of the divorce rate, one must however
keep in mind that agglomeration in search is not the only reason why an individual may be
less inclined to be married when the divorce rate is high. As noted above Burdett et al (1999)
have recently shown that if people continue to search while matched, this can lead to multiple
equilibria which diﬀer in the degree of “faithfulness” or “attachment”. An even more simple
explanation is of course that, generically, there may be stigma attached to deviating from the
average behavior. However, it is still interesting that a high aggregate divorce rate appears to
reduce the ﬁnancial cooperation between partners.
IX Conclusions
It is sometimes argued that welfare state arrangements break up families and prevent family
formation, partly because they take on some of the functions otherwise performed by the family.
This paper constructs a stylized model of marriage and divorce in which partners have the option
of engaging in voluntary sharing of earnings-risk. Risk-sharing between partners is supported
by expected reciprocity: as such it contributes to the beneﬁt of marriage, but it is also restricted
by the risk of divorce. Consequently, any policy change that increases the relative attractiveness
of divorce will not only directly increase the individuals’ proneness to choose singlehood, but
will also reduce the level of cooperation between partners which in turn further reduces the
relative attractiveness of marriage and so on.
27The model predicts that partners change their behavior in response to new information about
their match-quality. In particular, the better is the current match-quality, the more risk will
the shared between the partners. On the other hand, the worse is the current match-quality the
less the partners will cooperate. Since a low current match-quality is also correlated with a high
divorce risk, the model predicts that the level of ﬁnancial cooperation between partners should be
negatively correlated with future divorce risk. The model further reconciles the observation that
there is a low correlation in a simple cross-country comparison of welfare spending and divorce
rates with the claim that publicly provided insurance monotonically aﬀects family formation
decision. The mechanism underlying this result is a standard assumption of increasing returns
in the matching technology characterizing the marriage market. As a consequence the same
economy can sustain multiple steady state equilibria diﬀering in the rate of turnover in the
marriage market and the role of the family in providing ﬁnancial security.
The model also highlights how reciprocity-based ﬁnancial cooperation can have important
implications for policy-design. Despite equilibrium multiplicity it is shown that publicly pro-
vided earnings-insurance aﬀects family formation in a monotone fashion: the more insurance is
provided publicly, the more time people will spend in singlehood. Publicly provided insurance
is also argued to potentially severely crowd out private informal insurance partly by making
singlehood relatively more attractive and thus making it more diﬃcult for partners to sustain
cooperation. It is also shown that, when cooperation between partners is based on expected
reciprocity, a decentralized steady state equilibrium fails to be locally ineﬃcient, but that it
may be that the direction of ineﬃciency is ambiguous: it may be that an equilibrium has too
few married individuals.
An empirical analysis based on international survey data was then presented. The ﬁndings
were consistent with the theory: more generous welfare spending and higher aggregate divorce
rates seemed to reduce the probability than an individual has a steady partner, and also the
income-pooling by those individuals that do have partners.
Appendix
P r o o fo fC l a i m1.L e t B(Θ) denote the space of bounded real-valued functions on Θ,a n d
endow this space with the sup norm. Blackwell (1965) provides the following suﬃcient condition
for T : B(Θ) → B (Θ) to be a contraction mapping (with modulus β):
281. (monotonicity) f,g ∈ B (Θ) and f (θ) ≥ g(θ) for all θ ∈ Θ implies (Tf)(θ) ≥ (Tg)(θ) for
all θ ∈ Θ,a n d
2. (discounting) there exists some β ∈ (0,1) such that (Tf+a)(θ) ≤ (Tf)(θ)+βa for all
f ∈ B(Θ), θ ∈ Θ and a ≥ 0.

















where α ∈ A
f







+ θi + δ
N X
j=0
πijf (θj) ≥ u(ym)+δV (s). (A2)
Lemma A.1. T is a contraction mapping.
Proof. The proof uses Blackwell’s suﬃciency conditions. Consider ﬁrst “monotonicity”. From




i for all i; “monotonicity”
then follows immediately follows from Equation (A1).
Consider then “discounting”. Let Γi (a) ≡ maxα∈A
f+a
i
υ(α)+δa and note that (Tf+a)(θi)=
max{V (s),Γi (a)+Ki} where Ki does not depend on a.I fΓi (a) then always grows at a rate


















where ιmk = 1 if the mk’th incentive constraint is relaxed by the increase in a and else is zero.
Thus, since αmk ∈ [0,1/2] and ym >y k,
Γ0












+ δ < (1 − δ)+δ = 1,
where the second inequality follows from Assumption 2. #
Since T is a contraction mapping it has a unique ﬁxed point f∗ ∈ B (Θ) and furthermore,
Tn
h → f∗ as n →∞for any h ∈ B(Θ) (“the method of successive approximations”). From (2)
and (3) TV = V ;t h u sV exists and is unique. Then apply the method of successive approxima-
tions: deﬁne V0 (θ)=θ for all θ ∈ Θ.F o rn ≥ 1, Vn is recursively deﬁned: Vn = TVn−1 (implying
29that Vn = Tn
V0). Since Θ is ordered increasingly V0 (θj) increases in j. Assume then that
Vn−1 (θj) also increases in j. Using stochastic dominance (Assumption 1),
PN
j=0 πijVn−1 (θj)




i .C o n s e q u e n t l y















increases in i. By induction on n, Vn (θi) increases in i for all n, whereby V (θi) = limn→∞Vn (θi)
also increases in i.S i n c eΘ is ordered increasingly, this is equivalent to V (·) being increasing
in θ.
Proof of Claim 2. Since the incentive constraints are independent of each other (see Equation
(3)) Ai can be expressed as follows: Ai = ×m>k [0,αi·mk] where each αi·mk is an upper bound
in the range [0,1/2]. Furthermore, trivially α(θi)=αi ≡ (αi·mk)m>k. Using Claim 1 and
stochastic dominance (Assumption 1), i>jimplies Aj ⊆ Ai whereby αj ≤ αi.
P r o o fo fC l a i m3 .The Claim follows if ∆(θ) ≡ V (θ)−V (s) decreases in τ for all θ ∈ Θ.T h e
argument is by induction. Consider an n-period approximation to original problem: Suppose the
couple must divorce after n periods, but can divorce at any time before that. (The reader might
argue that no risk-sharing can be sustained if the horizon is known to be ﬁnite. However, that
relies on a subgame perfection argument that does not invalidate the approximation.) Let Vn (θ)
denote the value of being in state θ with a maximum of n periods remaining; then as the horizon
n goes to inﬁnity it’s impact will vanish. Since no remarriage is possible V (s)=υ(0)/(1 − δ).
When n =0 , V0 (θ)=V (s) for all θ ∈ Θ,a n d∆0 (θ)=V0 (θ) − V (s) trivially (weakly)
decreases in τ for all θ ∈ Θ. Assume then that ∆n−1 (θ) decreases in τ for all θ ∈ Θ.F o rn ≥ 1,
Vn (·) satisﬁes the following recursive deﬁnition:
















where α ∈ A
Vn−1
i if and only if α ∈ A and, for all m>ksuch that αmk > 0,
u
¡
e y2 − α
¡




+ θi + δ
N X
j=0
πij∆n−1 (θj) ≥ 0. (A4)
Using that (1 − δ)V (s)=υ(0), it follows that


















υ(α).T h u s i f υ∗
n (θi) − υ(0) decreases in τ, ∆n (θi) will also
decrease in τ. If complete risk-sharing is sustainable, υ∗
n (θi)=υ(1/2);b u tυ(1/2) − υ(0)
naturally decreases in τ since the additional formal insurance is more valuable when no risk-
sharing is available. Suppose then that risk-sharing is incentive constrained implying that (A4)
holds with equality. An increase in τ decreases e y2 as well as ∆n−1 (θj) for every j; from (A4)
(using u00 < 0) the self-enforceability constraint is therefore tightened, forcing a reduction in
the absolute transfer α
¡
e y2 − e y1¢
. υ∗
n (θi) − υ(0) then decreases in τ also due to the crowding
out eﬀect on private risk-sharing.
By induction on n, ∆n (θ) then decreases in τ for every θ ∈ Θ and n.L e t t i n gn go to inﬁnity
∆(θ)=l i m n→∞ ∆n (θ) also decreases in τ for each θ ∈ Θ.
P r o o fo fC l a i m4 . The proof uses that φ aﬀects V (θ) only through V (s). Thus start by
treating V (s) as parametrically given and note that:
Lemma A.2. ∆(θ) ≡ V (θ) − V (s) and α(θ) decreases in V (s) for all θ ∈ Θ.
Proof. The proof uses the same n- p e r i o da p p r o x i m a t i o na su s e di nt h ep r o o fo fC l a i m3 .F o r
n =0 , V0 (θ)=V (s) for all θ ∈ Θ while for n ≥ 0, Vn (θ) is deﬁned recursively as in (A3),
where now α ∈ A
Vn−1







+ θi − u(ym)+δ
N X
j=0
πij∆n−1 (θj) ≥ 0. (A6)
∆0 (θ)=V0 (θ)−V (s) trivially (weakly) decreases in V (s) for all θ. Assume then that ∆n−1 (θ)
decreases in V (s) for all θ. From (A6) the set A
Vn−1
i then decreases in V (s). Note that
















Hence ∆n (θi) decreases in V (s). Moreover, as noted in the proof of Claim 2, A
Vn−1
i can be
expressed as the cross-product of M (M − 1)/2 intervals where the set of upper bounds is the
optimal risk-sharing agreement. Then since A
Vn−1
i decreases in V (s) for all i it follows that
αn (θ) decreases (component by component) in V (s) for all θ. By induction on n it follows that
∆n (θ) as well as αn (θ) decreases in V (s) for all n and θ.L e t t i n gn →∞the result follows. #
Lemma A.3. V (s) increases in φ.
31Proof. Subtracting V (s) from both sides of (7) shows that:





holds identically. Noting that l.h.s. increases in V (s) (by Lemma A.2) the result follows. #
Combining Lemma A.3 and Lemma A.2 and noting that divorce is optimal whenever ∆(θ)=
0, monotonicity of b θ and α(θ) in φ follows.





are increasing, the composite mapping is an increasing step-function and is hence
“continuous but for upward jumps”. Furthermore, since b θ increases in τ the composite mapping
increases in τ; then from Milgrom and Roberts (1994, Corollary 1) it follows that the lowest
and the highest ﬁxed point, SL (τ) and SH (τ), both increase in τ.
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